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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN L. MATLOCK, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
- v s -
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 60174 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by the plaintiff insured, 
aga ins t the defendant insurer , to determine coverage rights of the insured and 
insurer under a Family Automobile Policy with respect to a 1951 Chevrolet one 
and one-half ton truck purchased on January 5 , 1973 but not l icensed or used 
until April 6, 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The ca se was tried to the court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist , 
District Judge pres iding. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff insured, the 
defendant a p p e a l s . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, appel lant , seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in i ts favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a declaratory judgment act ion filed by the plaintiff insured 
agains t the defendant insurance company asking that an endorsement issued by 
the defendant to plaintiff effective the 8th day of April, 1973, to p la in t i f f s 
insurance policy be declared in full force and effect a s of April 7, 1973 so a s 
to cover a one car accident which occurred on the 7th day of April, 1973, in the 
area of Del ta , Colorado and involved a 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half ton 
t ruck. 
At the time the declaratory action was filed it was primarily for the 
purpose of determining the insurance company's responsibil i ty to pay the medical 
bi l ls of James Horton, the driver of the one and one-half ton t ruck. The suit was 
commenced with service of summons on the Insurance Commissioner on June 19, 
1974. In September, 1974, a suit was filed by James Horton agains t Dr. 
Matlock for damages for injuries ar is ing out of the one car acc iden t . The defense 
of this suit was tendered to GEICO (R. 116) which had a s of May 6, 1974 denied 
coverage . GEICO declined to defend the Colorado suit which is being presently 
defended by counsel hired by the company which i ssued Dr. Matlock 's Farm 
Liability Policy. 
Dr. Melvin Matlock first acquired insurance with Government Employees 
Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to a s "GEICO" in the 1950's (R. 123 ; 
see a l so Exhibit "O") . During the period from the purchase of his first policy to 
the occurrence involved in th is lawsuit he changed vehicles many times (R. 123, 
L. 17). In 1964 he acquired a fruit farm in Del ta , Colorado, which then became 
known a s the M & M Orchards (R. 124, L. 1) . At that time he owned a 1963 
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Chevrolet three-quarter ton pickup truck which was insured about August 12, 
1963 under his then existing GEICO policy No, 506-14-76-1. This vehicle was 
placed on the farm for farm use sometime after May of 1964 (R, 119). At the 
time he transferred the 1963 Chevrolet pickup truck to the farm he also had one 
or more passenger vehicles insured with GEICO (R. 124, L. 10). These vehicles 
were insured on the same policy (R. 134, L. 9). He had a 1963 Chevrolet 
Corvette which was insured with GEICO and which was involved in a serious 
accident in 1965 in Ogden, Utah (R. 128, L. 14) and he had a 1967 Pontiac 
which was insured with GEICO (R. 124; see Exhibit "D-7n) . 
On October 1, 1970 he advised the company in writing that the 1963 
Chevrolet three-quarter ton pickup truck had been traded in on a 1971 Ford pickup 
truck and asked that it be covered under policy No. 506-14-76-1 with the same 
coverage as the Chevrolet had (Exhibit "D-4"). 
On August 21, 1972 Dr. Matlock wrote a letter from Pocatello, Idaho 
requesting coverage on a 1972 Chevrolet three-quarter ton pickup truck on which 
he had a nine and one-half foot camper, which vehicle and camper were kept in 
Pocatello, Idaho. Coverage was to be under the same policy, 506-14-76-1 
(Defendant's Exhibit "D- l " , R. 121, L. 22). This vehicle was at the time insured 
with Security Mutual Insurance Company, He did not hear from GEICO and wrote 
a reminder letter on October 7, 1972 because he had not heard from them 
(Defendant's Exhibit 2). When he did not hear from the company immediately/ 
he renewed the existing coverage on the vehicle with Security Mutual Insurance 
Company. This was one of three vehicles he had insured with Security Mutual 
Insurance Company prior to January 1, 1973 and continuously through April of 
- 3 -
1973 (R. 121, 122, 94). 
On December 29, 1972 GEICO wrote Dr. Matlock a letter acknowledging 
receipt of notice that Dr. Matlock had insured the 1972 three-quarter ton pickup 
truck and camper with another company and asked that he advise GEICO when he 
covered the 1972 Chevrolet with another firm so that they could correct his policy 
coverages for the 1971 Ford without lapse (Exhibit l ,D-3n) . 
GEICO had, in fact, issued coverage on the 1972 Chevrolet with camper 
and sent a policy endorsement to him along with a billing which he returned 
explaining he had taken insurance with another company (Plaintiffs Exhibit "P", 
P. 2; also Exhibit "B"). The company inadvertently continued for a time to bill 
him for coverage on this vehicle, and he wrote several letters trying to straighten 
the billing out (R. 117, 133). 
All of the vehicles, both those on the farm and those he had at his home 
or office were registered in his name (R. 130). 
On January 5, 1973 he purchased from North Ogden Canning Company 
in his name a 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half ton truck (R. 131, Plaintiffs 
Exhibit "DD," "EE," and Defendant's Exhibit 6). North Ogden Canning Company 
was closed down at the time and in the process of being sold (R. 132). A check 
dated January 9, 1973 drawn on the M & M Orchards account for the sum of $750.00 
and signed by Melvin L. Matlock was issued to North Ogden Canning Company 
in payment for the vehicle (Exhibit "0 -6" ) . The title was endorsed by Leslie E. 
Randall, president of the North Ogden Canning Company on January 5, 1973 
(Exhibit "DD"). Mr. Randall was an uncle of Mrs. Matlock (R. 132). The vehicle 
was not licensed at the time of purchase and had not been used during 1972 
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(R. 130, L. 18). It remained in the shed where it was parked at North Ogden 
Canning Company until April 6, 1973, while the keys were apparently left in 
the vehicle and the shed was enclosed inside a locked fence area. As far as 
North Ogden Canning Company was concerned, Dr. Matlock could have removed 
the vehicle at any time (R. 130, L. 4), Dr. Matlock testified that the title was 
sent to him or given to him by Mr. Randall, the president of North Ogden 
Canning Company some time during the period January to March, 1973 (R. 130), 
and the registration was also apparently given him at the same time (R. 136). 
The title was sent to his employee, James Horton, at Delta, Colorado some time 
after Dr. Matlock received it (R. 88). 
Mr. Horton acquired a Colorado certificate of title to the truck in the 
name of Melvin L. Matlock (Exhibit "BB") as of April 6, 1973 and flew to Ogden 
to drive the truck back to Delta, Colorado. He and Dr. Matlock went to the 
North Ogden Canning Company, got the truck out of the building in which it was 
parked and on April 7th about noon Mr. Horton departed Ogden and was involved 
in a one car accident near Delta, Colorado about 10:00 p.m. on April 7, 1973. 
At about 6:00 p.m. on April 7, 1973 he mailed a letter advising the company he 
had purchased and put in service effective that date a used one and one-half ton 
truck which he would like insured for liability only with the same coverage as 
the Ford truck had under Policy No. 506-14-76-1 (Plaintiffs Exhibit "I"). 
He received a call from James Horton1 s son at about 11:30 p.m. on the 
7th of April advising him of the accident and that his father was in the hospital 
in Grand Junction, Colorado. 
A few days later Dr. Matlock wrote a letter to GEICO advising them 
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that the accident had occurred. 
Dr. Matlock contacted, or was contacted shortly after the accident by, 
McMillan Claims Service in Grand Junction, Colorado and subsequently Miles 
Hollcraft Company, claims adjusting company in Ogden, Utah,also contacted 
him regarding the claim (R. 98 , 99) . In December, 1973, or early 1974, and it 
could have been earl ier , one of Hollcraft1 s representat ives called on him and 
took a history of the information he had pertaining to the truck accident and 
coverage quest ions (R. 136, 137; a l so Exhibits "FV "X," "E , " and "D") . 
On January 22, 1974 a non-waiver of rights letter was mailed to Dr. 
Matlock by GEICO (Plaintiffs Exhibit "Z"), and on May 6, 1974 a denial of 
coverage letter was sent to Dr. Matlock (Plaintiffs Exhibit "AA"), whereupon 
this declaratory judgment act ion was filed by plaintiff. 
On May 25, 1973 he received a let ter from GEICOfs Washington office 
requesting additional information pertaining to the loss (Plaint iffs Exhibit "M") . 
At this time GEICO was in the process of set t ing up a new claims office in San 
Francisco to service the Western States which included Colorado and Utah. Later 
he was told that his claim had been transferred to the San Francisco office 
(R. 117, L. 22). 
On June 8, 1973 GEICO issued a general change endorsement effective 
April 8, 1973 to Policy No. 506-14-76-1 extending coverage on the 1951 Chevrolet 
one and one-half ton truck (Exhibit "B", R. 99) . The policy period on this policy 
was from March 30, 1973 to March 30, 1974 (Exhibit "B"). Until the one and 
one-half ton truck was insured by the company on April 8, 1973 Dr. Matlock had 
never insured a truck other than a one-half or three-quarter ton pickup variety 
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(R. 142,143). 
The insurance policy under Definitions, Part I, with respect to owned 
automobile provides as follows: 
"Owned Automobile" means 
(a) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile described in 
this policy for which a specific premium charge indicates that 
coverage is afforded, 
•k "k ic 
(c) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile, ownership of 
which is acquired by the named insured during the policy 
period, provided: 
* rk * 
(2) the company insures all private passenger, farm and 
utility automobiles owned by the named insured on the 
date of such acquisition and the named insured notifies 
the company within 30 days after the date of such 
acquisition of his election to make this and no other 
policy issued by the company applicable to such 
automobile. 
"Private Passenger Automobile" means a four wheel private passenger, 
station wagon or jeep type automobile; 
"Farm Automobile" means an automobile of the truck type with a load 
capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less not used for business or 
commercial purposes other than farming; 
"Utility Automobile" means an automobile, other than a farm 
automobile, with a load capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less 
of the pickup body, sedan, delivery or panel truck type not used 
for business or commercial purposes. 
The trial court ruled: 
1. That the 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half ton truck was not under 
the terms of the policy acquired nor did it become an owned automobile by the 
insured until he registered it in his name and took operational control on the 6th 
of April, 1973, the day before the accident. 
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2. That the provision in the policy limiting the automatic 30-day 
coverage with respect to farm vehicles to those having a load capacity of 1,500 
pounds or l e s s , is an approximate guide l ine , not enforced by the defendant in 
the pas t and that in any event the controlling word is a farm vehic le . 
The court further stated that one-half ton and three-quarter ton pickup trucks are 
often loaded with more than 1,000 or 1,500 pounds and the one and one-half ton 
truck was to be used in connection with the orchard and w a s , therefore, a farm 
vehicle within the meaning of the pol icy. 
3 . That the plaintiff had been led by the defendant insurance company 
to bel ieve that the defendant would provide a defense and make the necessary 
investigation to adequately defend the claim and that plaintiff had been prejudiced 
in this respect and is in no posit ion to adequately take over the defense of the 
pending action and further that the reservation of rights and denial of coverage 
were not t imely. 
From these rulings and findings and any others which the court made 
supporting i ts dec is ion , the defendant files this appea l . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING 
THAT THE 30-DAY AUTOMATIC COVERAGE UNDER THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY FOR A NEWLY ACQUIRED 
VEHICLE COMMENCED ON THE DATE THE ONE AND 
ONE-HALF TON TRUCK WAS PUT INTO OPERATIONAL 
USE RATHER THAN FROM THE DATE OF ACQUISITION. 
The term "owned automobile" is defined in Part I of the GEICO policy 
a s follows: 
(c) a private passenger , farm or uti l i ty automobile, ownership of 
which is acquired by the named insured during the policy period 
provided: 
(2) The company insures all private passenger, farm and utility 
automobiles owned by the named insured on the date of such 
acquisition and the named insured notifies the company within 
30 days after the date of such acquisition of its election to 
make this and no other policy issued by the company applicable 
to such automobile. 
In attempting to determine whether the plaintiff actually notified the insurance 
company within the 30 day period, the critical issue hinges on the question of 
when the plaintiff acquired the 1951 truck. The key phrase to determining the 
question of coverage is "day of acquisition." Since the terms of the insurance 
policy do not specifically state what constitutes "date of acquisition" or owner-
ship of the automobile, it is necessary to examine several cases and other 
authorities in this field. 
Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Vol. 7, §4293, P. 91 states: 
Where the policy states in such provision that coverage is afforded 
when the insured acquires ownership, it means such ownership as 
the ordinary man would contemplate by such term, that i s , the 
right of user and such an interest in its protection that goes with 
a sense of ownership . . . And even the term "acquired" has been 
held to mean that the insured must have gained some title to the 
vehicle, it not referring to a mere temporary use without claim 
of ownership. 
In defining the term "acquired ownership" the court looked at such 
factors as dominion, control, use and the intentions of the parties. 
Although the insured, Melvin Matlock, made arrangements to purchase 
the automobile in January, 1973, he allegedly did not take actual possession of 
the automobile until approximately April 6, 1973 . He did have constructive 
possession. No one else used the vehicle. It was stored for his benefit. 
Although it was in a locked fence area, he could have taken it whenever he desired 
(R. 130, L. 4). The title was endorsed on the date of sale by the owner on 
January 5, 1973. In attempting to determine when the automobile was "owned" 
_ Q _ 
most courts have held that possess ion is not a requirement of ownership. In 
Commercial Standard Insurance Co . v . Universal Underwriters, 282 F.2d 24 
(I960, 10th Circuit , O k l a . ) , the insured had purchased a new automobile and 
had paid the entire purchase price to the automobile agency, but had agreed to 
pick up the automobile a t a later date pending the addition of certain accesso r i e s 
on the automobile. During the interim period the automobile was involved in an 
accident when driven by the automobile agency . The Tenth Circuit ruled that 
where the insured automobile had been traded in on purchase of a new automobile 
and the total purchase price was paid , but certain additional accesso r i e s were to 
be placed on the new vehic le , and that was done by the automobile agency, 
whose owner suggested to the husband of the named insured that they take a 
dr ive, and it was during such a drive while the agency owner was operating the 
vehicle that the accident occurred, the sa le had been completed prior to the 
acc ident , and the vehicle was a newly acquired automobile within coverage of 
the automobile l iabili ty pol icy . One of the defenses raised in that case was that 
the automobile was not owned by the insured, because the vehicle was not in the 
ac tua l possess ion of the insured. The court, applying Oklahoma law, concluded 
that possess ion was not a requirement of ownership. 
Another general rule is that a s between the part ies to the 
t ransac t ion , delivery of ac tual posses s ion is not essen t ia l 
to effect a transfer of t i t le un less so agreed by the pa r t i e s . 
Pharaoh v . Burnett and Moore, 112 Okla . 188, 240 P . 743 . . . 
And a third general rule is that what shal l const i tute transfer 
of t i t le ordinarily depends upon the intentions of the part ies to 
be gathered from the facts and circumstances peculiar to the 
t ransac t ion . 
In the ca se of Wisbey v . Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. } (1973) , 
507 P.2d 17 p r e . ) an insured who had full control of the inoperable automobile 
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from August 20th when he paid for the same and who was involved in a 
collision with an uninsured motorist on September 21st was held to have owned 
the automobile more than 30 days notwithstanding the automobile remained on 
the seller's premises, the certificate of title was not delivered until September 
3rd, and seller was not required to deliver tires which was done on September 
3rd when the automobile was moved, being towed from the seller's property. 
A similar holding was reached in the case of Williams v. Standard 
Accident Insurance Co . , 322 P.2d 1026 (1958, Calif.) where at the time of 
delivery of the vehicle to the insured the car was inoperable and without wheels 
or t ires. The insured rebuilt the car, and it was operating at the time of the 
accident. 
One must take into consideration that liability coverage is not the only 
coverage provided by insurance policies, but theft, fire and others may be 
involved in the 30-day automatic coverage involved. Automatic coverage i s , there-
fore, important and must considered even though the car is not being driven on the 
highway. Dr. Matlock would have a right and would, no doubt, insist on payment 
if the shed where his truck was stored had caught fire and his truck had been 
burned or if it had been stolen and he had fire and theft coverage on his policy. 
Several Courts have placed primary emphasis on the intentions of 
the parties in determining whether ownership has been established. In United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Minault, 72 A.2d 161 (1950, N. H.) action 
had been filed by U. S. F. & G. against Minault for a declaratory judgment to 
determine whether the insured automobile at the time of the accident was covered 
by a liability policy issued by the plaintiff. A decree was entered in favor of the 
defendants based on a finding that the plaintiff was liable on the policy; the case 
was transferred on plaintiff's exceptions. The Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire held that the evidence established that the insured still had title 
to the automobile at the time of the accident. The facts of the case revealed 
that the defendant Minault had decided in July of 1947 to sell his automobile 
for cash to Richard Detscher. After arriving at an agreement in price Detscher 
informed Minault that it would be necessary for him to travel to Concord, New 
Hampshire in order to obtain the necessary funds to purchase the automobile. 
On the way to Concord Mrs. Detscher was involved in an accident, resulting 
in a lawsuit. Minault had alleged in the suit that he was not liable because 
the automobile was no longer h is . On the issue of ownership the court said: 
The law here is that title passes when the parties intend it 
should. Their intention is a question of fact to be determined 
from the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and 
surrounding circumstances. Id_. 163. 
After reviewing all the facts in the case and examining the intentions 
of the parties the New Hampshire court ruled that title to the automobile had not 
passed to Detscher and thus Minault would be considered the owner and liable 
for subsequent injuries. 
In summary, the question of ownership is determined by examining 
such factors as (1) the intentions of the parties, or (2) the issue of control or 
dominion over the automobile. Most courts are in agreement that ownership is 
not based on possession or the registration of an automobile. 
If the language in the insurance contract is unclear as to the definition 
of ownership, courts will frequently turn to motor vehicle statutes for a concise 
definition. This was done by the California Court of Appeals in the Everly v. 
Creech, 294 P.2d 109 (Calif., 1956) decision when the court relied on the 
i o_ 
definition of "owner" according to West fs Annotated Civil Code, &1738; 
Vehicle Code, §66. If a court should decide that the definition of ownership 
is unclear pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract, it would then be 
necessary to examine the definition given in the Utah Code Annotated. The 
definition of "owner" is found in §41-l- l (u) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
It states: 
Owner—Person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or in the 
eventa vehicle is subject to conditional sale the person with 
an immediate right of possession. §41-1-72 states: 
Until the department shall have issued such new certificate of 
registration and certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle 
required to be registered shall be deemed not to have been made, 
and title thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and said 
intended transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to be 
valid or effective for any purpose except as provided in §41-1-77. 
The court, however, has construed the provisions of this section 
as not mandatory or controlling in their application. They do not confer or deny 
substantive rights. They are procedural or evidentiary in nature and provide a 
flag of warning to prospective transferees or encumbrances, much as do the 
registry acts relative to real estate and chattel mortgages . See Jackson v. Tames
 # 
97 Utah 41 , 89 P. 2d 235. 
§41-1-77 provides that the owner of a motor vehicle who has made 
a bona fide sale or transfer of his title or interest and who has delivered 
possession of such vehicle and certificate of registration and the certificate of 
title thereto properly endorsed to the purchaser or transferee shall not be liable 
for any damages thereafter resulting from negligent operation of such vehicle by 
another. 
It is our opinion that, whereas here, it would appear the seller had 
-13 -
delivered the registration certificate, the endorsed t i t le, and the possession 
of the vehicle to Mr. Matlock, he would be deemed to have acquired it under 
the terms of the policy. 
A second question to consider is the effect of failure to notify the 
insurance company within 30 days after acquisition of the automobile. The 
general rule is that failure to notify the insurance company within 30 days after 
acquisition of the vehicle will result in loss of insurance coverage. 34 A.L.R.2d 
Annotation, Automobile Insurance, 936, §7 states: 
It is well established that where the "automatic insurance" clause 
requires notice of the acquisition of a new automobile to be 
given the insurer, within a specified time after delivery, the 
period generally being either 10 or 30 days, a failure to give 
notice prior to the accident occurring after the expiration of the 
designated period precludes coverage of the new automobile. 
Jd . 943. 
In Mitcham v. Travelers Indemnity Co . , 127 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. , 1942) 
the court stated that the requirement of notice was of obvious importance to the 
insurer, serving to inform it of the identity and character of the vehicle to be 
covered and to enable it to exercise the rights reserved to it in the policy and to 
ascertain whether the insured had complied with his obligation thereunder, and 
that it could not be said that the policy provision was so immaterial to the risk 
that it could not be invoked for the purpose of avoiding the company1 s contractual 
liability. In Matthews v. Marquette Casualty Co . , 152 So.2d 577 the court said 
that the clear impact of the clause insuring additional vehicles from the date of 
acquisition provided the insured notifies insurer within 30 days is that automobiles 
in addition to that described in the policy are automatically insured for 30 days 
following the date of delivery to the insured but that coverage ceases if the insured 
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fails to give the required notice to the insurer. The generally accepted rule 
is that an automobile which is newly acquired is automatically covered by the 
insurance provided the insured notifies the insurance company within 30 days of 
the acquisition. Failure to notify the company within that time period will 
result in cancellation of the insurance coverage. 
Not all courts, however, are in complete agreement with this theory. 
In Ashgrove Lime and Portland Cement Co. v. Southern Surety Co . , 225 Mo. App. 
712/ 39 S.W.2d 434 (1931) the court held that a car received by the insured in 
exchange for another car which had been listed in a fleet policy giving automatic 
coverage to additional cars purchased by the insured was covered when involved 
in an accident some five months after the date of the exchange. The court stated 
that the notice provision was not for the purpose of allowing the insurer to say 
whether or not it was willing to extend coverage to newly acquired cars, but 
was rather intended to protect the insurer in collection of additional premiums on 
such cars, and concluded that the provision was not a condition precedent to 
coverage, but at most a condition subsequent and since the policy contained 
no forfeiture provision for failure to perform the condition, coverage was still 
in effect. 
Although there appears to be no cases in Utah directly on point, the 
Tenth Circuit follows the majority rule that if notice is not given during the 30-
day period, the coverage terminates at the end of such period. This position 
was affirmed in Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Lund, 234 F.2d 916 (1956, 
10th Circuit, Okla.) in an action by the insurer against the insured to determine 
the obligations and rights under an automobile insurance policy. The Tenth 
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that under the policy provisions pertaining to 
automatic coverage for newly acquired automobiles, giving of notice of 
acquisition was not a pre-requisite to coverage during the 30 day period 
provided for, but, if the notice was not given during such period, the coverage 
would terminate at the end of such period. The court said: 
Under the clear import of such provision, the automatic coverage 
becomes effective immediately upon the replacement and 
continues for a period of 30 days. The giving of the notice is 
not a pre-requisite of coverage during that period. If the notice 
is not given during the 30 day period, the coverage terminates 
at the end of such period. But the automatic coverage protects 
the insured against liability accruing within that period even 
though no notice of the replacement is given. Id_. 919. 
The final question to consider is whether it is material that 
notification was received the day after the accident. According to the facts, 
the insured, Melvin Matlock, sent the notification on April 7th, but the 
notification did not reach the insurance company until April 8th. The date of 
the accident was April 7th. The general rule accepted by most jurisdictions 
is that notice is not required to reach the insurance company prior to the acci-
dent, but it must reach the insurance company before the expiration of the 30-
day time limit. According to 34 A.L.R.2d, supra, §7: 
In this situation it has been generally held, on the theory that 
the requirement of notice is a condition subsequent rather than 
a condition precedent to extended coverage, that such coverage 
is automatically effected upon delivery of the new automobile 
and remains in effect until the end of the specified period, 
irrespective of whether notice has been given or not. Id_. 944. 
This general rule is also accepted by the Tenth Circuit in Tohnson v. 
Richard, 445 F.2d 1025 (1971, Utah). There the court held that under an automobile 
liability policy provision pertaining to automatic coverage for a newly acquired 
vehicle, giving notice of acquisition would not be a pre-requisite to coverage 
during the 30-day period provided for notice and an accident after acquisi t ion 
of a different vehic le , but before notice to the carrier did not affect the 
automatic coverage provision. The court said: 
In Western Casualty and Surety Co. -.v. Lund, 234 F. 2d 916 
(10th Circuit) we held that under a policy with a similar policy 
provision, the automatic coverage becomes effective im-
mediately on a replacement of the car and continues for the 
noticed period although the insured does not advise the 
company one way or the other. This appears to be the almost 
universal ru le . Thus an accident after the acquisit ion of a 
different vehicle but before notice to the carrier, does not 
affect the automatic coverage provision. In the case before 
us we thus hold there is coverage by Employers on the trailer 
a t the time of the accident and a l so on the car . IcT. 1027. 
The rule that is accepted by most jurisdictions is that the insured is 
covered for the 30-day period, but he must give notification to the insurance 
company in order to extend coverage beyond that period. However, if the 
accident should occur during the 30-day period, but before notice is given to 
the insurance company, that does not negate the insurance coverage during that 
30-day period. 
In the instant ca se the insurance would not become effective until 
a t l eas t the date the company received and accepted the application which was 
on the 8th of April which was the date the company made the endorsement 
effective on this particular automobile. 
POINT I I . THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
HOLDING THAT THE 1951 CHEVROLET ONE 
AND ONE-HALF TON TRUCK QUALIFIED AS A 
FARM VEHICLE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 
POLICY AND THAT THE 30-DAY AUTOMATIC 
COVERAGE, THEREFORE, APPLIED. 
In i ts memorandum decision and in i ts findings and conclusions 
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the trial court stated that one-half ton trucks and three-quarter ton trucks 
are habitually loaded with more than 1,500 pounds and even up to 12,000 
pounds; that the one and one-half ton truck was an ordinary farm vehicle when used in 
connection with the orchard and was so regarded by the defendant company 
until they discovered the existence of the accident claim in question. That 
any other interpretation of the policy requirement would subject to no coverage 
all farm trucks or vehicles that are used or loaded with regular farm type loads 
at any particular time (R. 45,51). 
The trial court appears to have missed the point completely on this 
issue in the case . The defendant is not and has not claimed that the overloading 
of a vehicle takes it out of the policy coverage. The issue here is whether j 
i 
under the provisions of the policy the insured is entitled to the benefit of the 
i 
automatic 30-day coverage provision when the vehicles does not come within
 ( 
the category of those vehicles described in the policy as passenger, farm or i 
i 
utility vehicles. 
i 
It is undisputed that the insurance company is entitled to contract and
 { 
fix its obligations and rights under a policy as long as the provisions are not i 
i 
unreasonable, illegal or contrary to public policy, and such provisions are 
i 
binding upon both the insurer and insured. Appleman, Vol. 4, Insurance Law , 
& Practice, §2105, P. 8. The insurer in this instance has the right to define I 
i 
the terms passenger, farm and utility vehicles and the parties are bound by their 
i 
written agreement. i 
The only load capacity that the contract reasonably could provide for i 
i 
would be the manufacturer's rated capacity. A case directly in point is Buswell 
i 
v. Biles, 205 So.2d 165 (La. , 1968). In that case the insurance policy con-
tained the exact provisions that are contained in GEICOfs policy under 
definitions of an owned automobile, and passenger , farm and utili ty vehic le . 
(These are standard provis ions.) 
Mr. Biles contended a farm or util i ty automobile within the terms 
of the policy depends upon whether the vehicle had a capacity of 1,500 pounds 
or l e s s , and this capacity limitation refers to actual maximum load capaci ty . 
The court said: 
It must be conceded the testimony is conclusive that both the 
1965 one-half ton pickup and the three-quarter ton pickup were 
capable of carrying loads in excess of 2,000 pounds each 
without destroying the vehic le . 
The lower court agreed with Biles and held the 1952 Ford three-quarter ton 
pickup was not a farm or uti l i ty automobile a s defined in the policy because it 
was poss ib le for it to haul more than 1,500 pounds . 
The appel late court held this was error and stated: 
We find from the record that it was the clear intent of both 
the insurer and the insured that the load capaci ty a s 
contemplated by these part ies was the manufacturer's 
designation of the pickups a s one-half ton and three-quarter 
ton t rucks . 
GEICO did not refuse coverage on the vehic le , but they covered 
the one and one-half ton Chevrolet truck a s of the date they received the 
application for co/erage rather than giving Dr. Matlock the 30-day automatic 
coverage which, under the c i rcumstances , he was not entitled t o . The trial 
court should have ruled that the vehicle did not qualify for the automatic 
coverage. 
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POINT III. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING 
THAT THE 30-DAY AUTOMATIC COVERAGE APPLIED 
UNDER THE POLICY IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT ALL 
OF PLAINTIFF'S PASSENGER, FARM AND UTILITY 
VEHICLES WERE NOT INSURED WITH GEICO AS 
REQUIRED BY ITS POLICY. 
Exhibit "BB" shows definitely that t i t le to the 1951 Chevrolet was 
issued by the State of Colorado to Melvin L. Matlock, and Mr. Matlock does 
not dispute this fact . All of the veh ic l e s , both those on the farm and those 
he had at his home or office, whatever the case may b e , were registered in 
his name (R. 130). 
The policy provisions with respect to a newly acquired vehicle 
clearly se t forth that the 30-day automatic coverage appl ies only if the insured 
insures a l l automobiles owned by the insured a s of the delivery date of an 
addit ional automobile (See Exhibit "A," first page - owned automobile). 
P la in t i f fs Exhibit n C" which is a policy request form has in bold 
print on the very front of it: 
"Important" 
Your Policy Provides Automatic Insurance For a Newly Acquired 
Automobile, whether it replaces one described in your policy 
or i s an additional car , provided we insure al l automobiles 
owned by you a s of the delivery date of an addit ional au to , 
and GEICO is notified within 30 days of del ivery. 
The purpose of automatic insurance coverage is to give 
coverage to persons who are already insured with the company 
in quest ion upon acquiring a new veh ic le . The coverage extends 
to the new acquisi t ion when it replaces the sole automobile 
owned by the insured, when the insured owns a number of 
vehicles and al l of them are insured with the company, or 
when several of the vehicles owned by the insured are 
covered by the policy and the new acquisi t ion replaces 
one already covered. It does not apply to new vehicles 
which are in addition to those insured by the former 
coverages and which are not used a s replacements un less 
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all vehicles of that insured are covered, in which event it is 
contemplated that a premium readjustment will be m a d e . . . . 
The insurance protection given is also limited to the nature 
of the risk originally insured, and is confined to the same 
policy period. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Vol. 7, 
§4293 P. 84,85. 
In the case of Auto Lease Co. v. Central Mutual Insurance Co . , 
7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264, our court held that where Central Mutual had 
issued its policy to Auto Lease Company describing five vehicles which were 
leased to Bearing Service, but Auto Lease owned other automobiles which were 
not insured by Central Mutual, a vehicle purchased as a replacement for one 
of the five cars was not covered under the additional automobile provision of 
the automatic coverage clause since Central Mutual did not insure all 
automobiles owned by Auto Lease. 
See also Buswell v. Biles, supra; and DeSear v. Hardware Dealers 
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., (1967 , 5th Circuit), 381 F.2d 367 (Fla.). 
There are many cases supporting the holdings of the three cited 
cases . Appellant has not found any case holding that the provision restricting 
automatic coverage of additional vehicles to those instances where all vehicles 
owned by the named insured are insured by the insurer as being unreasonable, 
illegal or against public policy. 
Plaintiff claims that M & M Orchards is also a named insured, but 
this is not true. Dr. Matlock was the owner of the vehicle and the named 
insured. M & M Orchards, P. O. Box 6, Delta, Colorado, as appears on 
Exhibit "B" is only the address for the farm and the place where the vehicle 
was to be used and kept. M & M Orchards was not a corporation or a legal 
separate entity but a name under which Dr. Matlock operated his orchard. He 
was the sole owner of the vehicle. 
He was not entit led under his policy with Security Mutual nor his 
GEICO policy to automatic 30-day coverage for any additional vehicle 
acquired by him. 
His application for coverage was subject to acceptance by the company, 
and was effected by the company on the 8th of April, 1973. They could have 
refused to cover the risk at a l l if they so e lec ted . 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY HAD 
WAIVED ITS RIGHTS OR WAS ESTOPPED TO DENY 
COVERAGE UNDER THE POLICY BECAUSE OF ITS 
CONDUCT IN INVESTIGATING THE ACCIDENT. 
The insurance company issued i ts endorsement covering the 1951 
Chevrolet one and one-half ton truck on June 8, 1973 effective April 8, 1973 
to Policy No. 506-14-76-1 which had been in effect for many yea r s , had an 
annual premium rate with a policy period that dated from March 30 to March 
30 of the following year , with the current policy period for the policy involved 
in this accident of March 30, 1973 to March 30, 1974. When the general 
endorsement was sent to the insured in June of 1973 he noted the effective 
date covering the 1951 truck of 4-8-73 and w a s , therefore, put on notice that 
the defendant insurance company was not covering his accident of April 7, 
1973. Plaintiff claims that the policy was corrected on October 29 , 1973 to 
show coverage on the 1951 Chevrolet , but the evidence does not show t h i s . 
The exhibit (Plaintiffs Exhibit "B") merely shows that the policy period was 
from March 30, 1973 to March 30, 1974. These are the same dates that this 
policy period had run for many y e a r s . Dr. Matlock w a s , therefore, on notice 
that he should probably invest igate the accident himself. He , however, 
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together with James Horton were the primary witnesses to the transactions 
involving this matter. 
Dr. Matlock did talk to the Hortons and James Horton with his 
family is still living on the farm property. Until suit was filed by Horton Dr. 
Matlock had plenty of opportunity to talk to Mr. Horton. The police officer's 
report is available as is also the investigation of GEICO. The declaratory action 
was not filed until June of 1974, and the federal action in September of 1974 
which is being defended by Dr. Matlock's farm liability carrier. He also had 
a letter from McMillan Claims Service, an independent adjuster, dated August 
8, 1973 that GEICO could not find a policy verifying coverage for the 1951 
Chevrolet and for him to send a copy of his policy to them so they could deter-
mine coverage which he was claiming (Plaintiffs Exhibit "D"). The company 
was in the process of establishing a claims office in San Francisco to service 
the claims for the Western States and this claim was transferred to the San 
Francisco office for handling which may have caused some delay in cor-
respondence and handling. 
On August 21, 1972 Dr. Matlock applied for coverage under his 
GEICO policy on a 1972 three-quarter ton pickup with a camper on it. This 
vehicle was at his home in Pocatello, Idaho at the time. He did not hear 
from the company with respect to his application and wrote a reminder letter 
on October 7, 1972 because he had not heard from them (Defendant's Exhibit 
"D- l " , R. 121, and Defendant's Exhibit 2). The company subsequently sent 
him a policy covering the 1972 camper, but in the meantime he had renewed 
his coverage with Security Mutual Insurance Company and returned the policy 
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to GEICO, advising them that he had renewed his coverage with Security. 
He did advise the company he wanted his coverage continued on the 1971 
Ford pickup. The company sent him a letter dated December 29, 1972 
acknowledging receipt of his notice that the 1972 Chevrolet w a s covered by 
a policy with another company and inquired of him a s to the date it was insured 
with the other company so that they could continue the coverage on the 1971 
Ford pickup without lapse (Defendant's Exhibit 3) . 
GEICO had, in fact, i ssued coverage on the 1972 pickup with 
camper and inadvertently continued for a time to bil l him for coverage on this 
vehicle,and several let ters were written by him trying to straighten the bil l ing 
out (R. 117, 133). 
During this same period of time the investigation of the question of 
coverage and the facts of the accident were being checked by McMillan Claims 
Service in Grand Junction, Colorado and Miles Hollcraft Company in Ogden, 
Utah (R. 136 and 137; Pla int i f fs Exhibits "E , " " D # " "F" and "X"). 
On May 25, 1973 the GEICO Washington office sent a le t ter to him 
requesting additional information pertaining to the loss (Plaintiffs Exhibit 
"M") . He was in touch with McMillan Claims Service after the accident on 
several occas ions , and then was contacted by a claims representat ive from 
Miles Hollcraft Company in Ogden, Utah prior to or in December 1973 or 
early January, 1974, who took a history from him and told him, "This should 
wrap it "up" (R. 113). 
In January, 1974 he received a non-waiver letter dated January 22, 
1974 from GEICO's San Francisco office reserving rights in connection with 
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the investigation of the accident (Plaintiffs Exhibit "Z") and in May, 1974 
a letter from GEICO dated May 6, 1974 denying coverage. 
In connection with the medical bills incurred by Mr. Horton, Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield under Mr. Hortonfs individual policy was paying the 
medical bills and paid all of them except for a few which Dr. Matlock paid 
(Exhibit "N"). As previously stated, at the time the declaratory action was 
filed by the plaintiff no suit had been filed in federal court and it was GEICO1 s 
refusal to pay the medical bills which prompted the declaratory action. In 
connection with payment of the medical bills a memo was sent by McMillan 
Claims Service dated December 19, 1973 to Charles Traylor, an attorney whose 
identity or connection with the case is not established, wherein reference is 
made to a statement alleged to have been made to Dick Bottinelli, of McMillan 
Claims Service, to the effect that Washington had told him they had issued a 
draft . The draft was never, apparently, sent. The person who made the 
statement, if made, was never identified. Mr. Bottinelli, a lso , apparently 
on December 19, 1973, according to the memorandum, was told by a secretary 
or someone not identified in the San Francisco office that she would run the 
file down and make payment. This was not done, and the identity of the 
person was never established. He did advise Mr. Traylor in that memorandum 
that it would be necessary for Horton to submit a statement of claim. Dr. 
Matlock readily admitted that the fact that GEICO did not recognize the 
coverage did not influence the amount of the medical bills on Mr. Horton 
(R. 132). 
Section 31-19-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states as follows: 
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None of the following acts by or on behalf of an insurer 
shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of any provision 
of the policy or of any defense of the insurer thereunder; 
(1) acknowledgment of the receipt of notice of loss or of 
claim under the policy; (2) furnishing forms for reporting 
a loss or claim, for giving information relative thereto, 
or for making proof of loss or receiving or acknowledging 
receipt of any such form of proof filled out; (3) 
investigating any loss or claim under any policy or 
engaging in negotiations looking toward a possible sett le-
ment of any such loss or claim. 
In Buchanan v. Switzerland General Insurance Co . , (Wash., 1969), 
455 P.2d 344 the court distinguishes between estoppel and waiver: 
Waiver, either express or implied, has been defined as the 
voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of 
a known right. It is unilateral in that it arises out of either 
action or non-action on the part of the insurer or its duly 
authorized agents and rests upon circumstances indicating or 
inferring that the relinquishment of the right was voluntarily 
intended by the insurer with full knowledge of all the facts 
pertaining thereto. Citing Hopkins v. Northwestern National 
Life Insurance Co . , 41 Wash. 592, 83 P. 1019; Reynolds v. 
Travelers Insurance Co . , (Wash.), 28 P.2d 310; and 16A 
Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, §9081, 1968; 18 Couch 
on Insurance 2d §71-13. 
Estoppel, on the other hand, refers to a preclusion from asserting a 
right by an insurer where it would be inequitable to permit the assertion. It 
arises by operation of law, and rests upon ac t s , statements or conduct on the 
part of the insurer or its agents which lead or induce the insured, in justifiable 
reliance thereupon, to act or forbear to act to his prejudice. Abatement of the 
right or privilege involved by way of estoppel need not be intentionally, 
voluntarily or purposely effected by or on the part of the insurer. Reynolds v. 
Travelers Insurance Co . , supra; 16A Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, §9081, 
9088; 18 Couch on Insurance 2d §71-16. 
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An automobile liability insurer was not estopped taden^r coverage 
by the fact that it made a complete investigation of the accident which 
happened on December 5, 1965, but did not formally disclaim coverage until 
June 29, 1966, where the insurer would not know whether its policy provided 
coverage until it had determined what facts and circumstances surrounded the 
accident. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pearcef(1968, Neb.), 157 
N.W.2d399. 
Estoppel is the equitable doctrine that a party should not be permitted 
to repudiate an act done or position assumed where that course would work an 
injustice to another who, having ample reason to do so, has relied thereon. 
An estoppel may arise even where there is no intent to mislead, as long as 
one's conduct is sufficient to induce reasonable reliance upon the part of the 
other. The party estopped must have acted with the knowledge of the facts. 
However, the final element which must always be present in an estoppel is 
a change of position by the relying party with prejudice for injuries suffered as 
a proximate cause of such reliance. 
There has been no change of position by Dr. Matlock with prejudice 
for injuries suffered by him as a proximate cause of any reliance, and it was 
encumbent upon the insurer to determine all of the facts to assure itself that 
it was not making an error in establishing coverage for the one and one-half 
ton truck on April 8, 1973, rather than accepting coverage under the policy on 
the 30 day automatic coverage clause. 
In the case of State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Richard Kay 
and Myrtle Kay, 26 Utah 2d 195, 487 P.2d 852 (July, 1971) Richard Kay, who 
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was 35 years of age and lived with his mother, Myrtle Kay, was riding with 
his mother on August 4, 1968 when she either fell asleep or suffered a 
blackout and ran her vehicle off the highway and into a dirt embankment. ( 
Both sustained severe injuries. The insurance company made payment under 
the medical pay provisions of the injuries to both Myrtle Kay and Richard Kay. 
Subsequently Richard Kay, through his counsel, asserted a claim for his ' 
injuries to State Farm. By letter dated May 1, 1969 a field claim representative 
for State Farm notified Richard's counsel of the following exclusion in the 
policy: { 
This insurance does not apply under (1) coverage A to bodily injury 
to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing ! 
in the same household as the insured; . . . . 
On July 15, 1969 Richard filed an action against his mother claiming damages { 
i 
in the sum of $121,000.00. Myrtle Kay submitted the defense of the action to 
i 
State Farm and counsel for State Farm filed an answer on August 1, 1969. On
 f 
August 29, 1969 State Farm took Richard's deposition which was signed by 
i 
Richard on September 17, 1969 and on October 23, 1969 State Farm filed a 
declaratory judgment action asserting that no liability could exist under the , 
i 
terms of the policy because of the exclusion of coverage of the insured for 
i 
bodily injury to a member of the family of the insured residing in the same 
household and that inasmuch as there was no coverage, there was no duty to < 
i 
defend the insured. Defendants asserted that State Farm was estopped to deny 
i 
coverage since it unconditionally assumed the defense of Myrtle Kay without
 | 
taking any reservation of rights, although it possessed knowledge of the defense • 
i 
as evidenced by the letter from the field claims representative. The trial court 
i 
i 
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ruled as a matter of law that Myrtle Kay had been prejudiced and that State 
Farm was estopped to deny coverage. The plaintiff appealed. Myrtle Kay 
claimed that had she known that insurer's counsel would seek to represent 
conflicting interests, she would have procured her own counsel initially and 
that by her insurer's counsel representing her on her appearance she lost the 
right to control and manage her own case and the right to the individualized 
attention by counsel of her own choice, and the opportunity to settle or com-
promise the claim. She concluded that she was induced by State Farm to 
refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in her power from 
the time of the accident until the matter was set for trial on January 12, 1970. 
The court held: 
In the instant action there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that Mrs. Kay was deprived, by the conduct of State Farm, of 
an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense before trial or in 
the alternative, to effect a settlement with her son. There were 
no assertions that her counsel would have inadequate time to 
prepare a defense or that he lacked a reasonable opportunity 
to gather and preserve evidence or to institute certain pre-trial 
procedures. We are compelled to conclude that the trial court 
erred in its determination that Mrs. Kay's interest had been 
prejudicially affected by the conduct of State Farm. 
In the State Farm v. Kay case our court has, with respect to that 
case , followed the rule that there must be actual prejudice, not mere 
assertions of prejudice, to hold an estoppel against the insurance company. 
In this case , as in ours, the insurance company had made an investigation of 
the accident and was aware of the provision in the policy which amounted to an 
exclusion, if the facts came within that exclusion. The fact that the company 
extended a defense of the case , by filing an answer and taking a deposition 
before filing a declaratory action, was held not to constitute an estoppel. In 
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other words, the company was allowed to continue its investigation even 
though over a year had expired since the time of the accident without being 
guilty of conduct amounting to an estoppel. 
In the case before this court the lawsuit in Colorado was filed shortly 
before the tender of the defense on the 5th of September, 1974. The declaratory 
action was filed by plaintiff in June of 1974. 
In effect, Dr. Matlock is trying to bring within the coverage of the 
insurance policy a risk that is not covered by the terms of the policy in that he 
had his cars insured with two companies instead of one which would activate 
the automatic 30-day coverage clause. The 30-day automatic coverage was 
excluded under those circumstances and also the circumstance that the vehicle, 
a one and one-half ton truck, did not come within the provisions of the 
definition of owned vehicle under the policy. 
In §1135, 29A American Jurisprudence Insurance at p . 289, it 
is stated: 
The nile is well established that the doctrines of implied waiver 
and of estoppel, based upon the conduct or action of the insurer, 
are not available to bring within the coverage of a policy risks 
not covered by its terms, or risks expressly excluded therefrom, 
and the application of the doctrines in this respect i s , there-
fore, to be distinguished from the waiver of or estoppel to 
assert grounds of forfeiture. Thus, while an insurer may 
be estopped by its conduct or its knowledge from insisting upon 
a forfeiture of a policy, the coverage or restrictions on the coverage 
cannot be extended by the doctrine of waiver or estoppel. While 
it is true that if the insurer, with knowledge of facts which would 
bar an existing primary liability, recognizes such primary liability 
by treating the policy as in force, he will not thereafter be 
allowed to plead such facts to avoid his primary liability, the 
doctrine of waiver cannot be invoked to create primary liability 
and bring within the coverage of the policy risks not included 
or contemplated by its terms. 
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On page 13 of the supplement in Couch 2d on Insurance, Vol. 18, 
under §71-35 Existence of Contract, it is stated: 
Waiver and estoppel cannot create a new contract between the 
parties. Scott v. Industrial Life Insurance Co. ,411 S.W.2d 
769. See also Madgett v. Monroe County Mutual Tornado 
Insurance Co. (Wise ) , 176 N.W.2d 314 where it is also said: 
Estoppel cannot be used to create a contract of insurance. 
Waiver and estoppel usually cannot operate to extend coverage 
where none exists under the contract. Looney v. Allstate Insurance 
Co. (8th Cir . , Ark.), 392 F.2d 401. To establish a waiver 
evidence must show the acts of the insurer constituted a 
voluntary intentional relinquishment of a known right and that 
insurer had full knowledge of all pertinent facts. Wasilco v. 
Home Mutual Casualty Co. (Penn.), 232 A.2d 60. Also see 
Buchanan v. Switzerland General Insurance Co . , supra. 
With regard to plaintiffs claim that defendant's adjuster made 
certain statements which waived exclusions of liability coverage contained 
within the policy, defendant cites L. L. Buchanan v. Switzerland General 
Insurance Co . , supra. The court in this case did not allow the adjuster to make 
any waivers of a policy provision. 
Thus, for an independent adjuster, within our statutory framework, 
to effect a waiver of a policy or statutory framework, i . e . , an 
involuntary and intentional relinquishment of the provision, on the 
part of his principal, the insurer, it is necessary to establish 
that he was vested with the requisite degree of authority to effect 
the waiver. 
The court also states that: 
[W]e would indulge in no presumptions of authority on the part 
of an adjuster permitting him to waive such policy provisions on 
the part of an insurer absent proof of such added authority. 
There was no evidence submitted in the trial to show that the adjuster 
was given such express authority to effect a waiver of policy provisions. 
Lacking the presumption of authority or actual authority from the insurer, the 
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adjuster was not able to make such a waiver as plaintiff contends that he 
did. In additional support to defendant1 s contention of no presumed 
authority see Rosengrant v. National Mutual Assurance Co . , 76 Pa. D. and C. i 
188; Berger v. Aetna Life Insurance Co . , 95 N.Y.S. 541; andZick v. Boston f 
i 
Casualty C o . , 185 N.E. 362, 282 Mass. 491. 
i 
There was no proof that McMillan Claims Service had been authorized * 
to waive any rights that the company had. Exhibit "F" does not constitute such • 
a waiver and, in fact, is- not even addressed to Dr. Matlock. No particular 
I 
employee of GEICO was identified except the secretary who was going to look i 
for the file. The exhibit was introduced over the objection of defendant. See f 
i 
(R. 108, 109). 
There was no evidence to show that Dr. Matlock had, in fact, been < 
prejudiced by the investigation of the company in connection with its 
l 
investigation. He was put on notice initially that the coverage was placed 
the day after the accident. He knew that the investigation was under way and ' 
i 
was continuing and, in fact, received a request for additional information 
i 
directly from GEICO and was also requested to furnish additional information
 p 
through McMillan and through Miles Hollcraft Company in Ogden even into " 
i 
December of 1973. The investigation was complicated somewhat by the fact 
that the participants involved resided in two different states and also by the
 p 
fact that GEICO was in the process of setting up a Western office at San 
Francisco to handle the Western States claims. However, the federal court 
suit was not filed until September of 1974 some three months after the
 p 
i 
declaratory action was begun by the insured. He, therefore, had plenty of 
i 
i 
i 
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time to conduct his investigation and to use the necessary discovery pro-
cedures in connection with the federal court case . As a matter of fact, 
counsel for his farm liability carrier is handling that defense. It i s , therefore, 
respectfully submitted that there was neither waiver by the insurance company 
nor the basis for an estoppel against i t . 
CONCLUSIONS 
Defendant respectfully submits that the defendant insurer was 
entirely within its rights under the terms of the policy in placing the insurance 
on the one and one-half ton truck on the 8th day of April because the truck did 
not qualify as an owned automobile under the terms of the policy and also 
because the insured did not have all of the vehicles registered in his name 
insured with GEICO, The 30-day automatic coverage provision, therefore, 
never came into play. 
There is no evidence that the company waived any of its rights under 
the policy or was guilty of conduct which would estop it from standing upon 
those rights. 
The judgment in favor of the plaintiff insured should be reversed 
and judgment entered on behalf of the defendant that coverage did not exist 
for the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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